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To delineate the merits and demerits of dual class share structures, we should compare 
them to dispersed ownership structures with control contestability, concentrated 
ownership structures, and other control-enhancing mechanisms. Dual class structures 
facilitate long-term business strategies, firm-specific investments, equity financing and 
risk-taking, and they are simple, transparent and stable; but they insulate corporate 
controllers from shareholder monitoring, proxy contests and hostile takeovers, 
exacerbate tunnelling and shirking problems, and enable corporate controllers to 
achieve an extreme voting-cash flow rights divergence and to infringe existing 
shareholders’ voting rights. Law can deal with most disadvantages of dual class 
structures, except shirking problems. Policy-makers should ensure that law provides 
shareholders with sufficient protection and then make a choice between dual class 
structures’ benefits and constraints on shirking derived from concentrated corporate 
ownership.     
I. Introduction 
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In most companies, equity entails votes proportionately. Shareholders use their voting 
rights to monitor and, in certain circumstances, replace controllers of corporate affairs. 
This mechanism is employed to curb the agency problems between corporate 
controllers and public shareholders that the former may act in their private interests 
while at the expense of the latter’s investment benefits.1 
However, in some companies, voting rights and cash flow rights attached to 
shares are separated. As a result, some shareholders possess control over the company 
with holding a disproportionately low percentage of equity, while other shareholders, 
who own more residual claims to the company’s assets, have little influence over 
corporate decisions. Such governance structures where some shares, per unit of their 
cash flow rights, effectively give their holders more voting rights than other shares do 
are termed, in this article, as “dual class (share) structures”. 
Whether dual class structures are efficient organizational forms has been subject 
to great controversy since their emergence until now, because they simultaneously 
bring the benefits of a flexible capital structure and exacerbate the agency problems 
inherent in a corporate form of business.2 This article establishes a new three-layer 
                                                 
1 Depending on context, a corporate controller may be a director or a controlling shareholder. Both of 
them are disciplined by shareholders’ voting rights. When shares are dispersedly held, corporate control 
is held by directors, but they can be removed by shareholders’ votes. In a company with controlling 
shareholders who do not hold a majority of equity, the insurgent may seize control by acquiring more 
shares than the current controlling shareholders do. Although it is much more difficult, or even 
impossible, to capture corporate control when there exist controlling shareholders, controlling 
shareholders are less likely to harm the company because they sustain most of the value effects of their 
own actions as a result of their large shareholding.  
2  For the modern literature arguing for dual class structures, see Scott Bauguess, “Recontracting 
Ownership and Control: The Effects of Differential Voting Rights after Dual Class Recapitalization” 
(DPhil Thesis, Arizona State University 2004); Arman Khachaturyan, “Trapped in Delusions: 
Democracy, Fairness and the One-Share-One-Vote Rule in the European Union” (2007) 8 European 
Business Organization Law Review 335; Scott W. Bauguess, Myron B. Slovin and Marie E. Sushka, 
“Large Shareholder Diversification, Corporate Risk Taking, and the Benefits of Changing to Differential 
Voting Rights” (2012) 36 Journal of Banking & Finance 1244. For the modern literature arguing against 
dual class structures, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman and George Triantis, “Stock Pyramids, 
Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control 
from Cash-Flow Rights” in Randall K. Morck (ed), Concentrated Corporate Ownership (University of 
Chicago Press 2000); Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang and Fei Xie, “Agency Problems at Dual-Class 
Companies” (2009) 4 The Journal of Finance 1697; Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii and Andrew Metrick, 
“Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual Class Firms in the United States” (2010) 23 The Review of 
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analytical framework (hereinafter “Framework”) according to the governance effects 
achieved by dual class structures, and delineates their merits and demerits under the 
Framework. Further, this article demonstrates the role that law can play in the control 
of the downside of dual class structures and the trade-off inside a dual class structure 
when law provides public shareholders with sufficient protection. In particular, this 
article tries to offer to HK securities regulators some insights into the reasonableness 
of Hong Kong’s current policy that prohibits dual class listed companies. Nonetheless, 
most findings in this article apply to dual class structures generally, and may be found 
useful by other jurisdictions. 
In Hong Kong, unlisted companies are free to choose their security-voting 
structures. The Companies Ordinance (Cap 622) (CO) confers on a company great 
discretion over voting issues.3 At common law, a dual class structure adopted by a 
private company was permitted and enforced by the House of Lords.4 However, the 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) will refuse listing applications from (present 
and would-be) dual class companies, and companies already listed on the SEHK are 
not allowed to recapitalize themselves into dual class.5 In 2013, the SEHK’s refusal to 
list Alibaba Group Holding Ltd whose initial public offering (IPO) raised US$25 billion 
through the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) initiated a heated debate over Hong 
Kong’s current policy.6 The Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd (HKEx), the 
                                                 
Financial Studies 1051. Two articles review the theoretical models and the empirical evidence of dual 
class structures. Mike Burkart and Samuel Lee, “One Share-One Vote: The Theory” (2008) 12 Review 
of Finance 1; Renée Adams and Daniel Ferreira, “One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evidence” (2008) 
12 Review of Finance 51. 
3 CO, s 588(4). 
4 Bushell v Faith [1970] 1 All ER 53. 
5 SEHK Main Board Listing Rules, r 8.11; SEHK Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) Listing Rules, r 
11.25. The two rules allow the listing of dual class companies in exceptional circumstances agreed with 
the SEHK. However, to date, the SEHK has never listed a company using this exception. HKEx, 
“Concept Paper on Weighted Voting Rights” (August 2014) para 80. 
6 Leslie Picker and Lulu Yilun Chen, “Alibaba’s Banks Boost IPO Size to Record of $25 Billion” 
Bloomberg (22 September 2014), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-
22/alibaba-s-banks-said-to-increase-ipo-size-to-record-25-billion (visited 9 February 2015). 
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parent company of the SEHK, commenced a market consultation in August 2014,7 but 
postponed its second stage indefinitely due to the Securities and Futures Commission’s 
(SFC) opposition to dual class listings.8 
II. Dual Class Share Structures: Forms and Prevalence 
Dual class share structures may be employed in several forms. The typical form is plural 
/ multiple classes of shares with unequal votes. In most typical dual class companies, 
two classes of ordinary shares are issued, i.e. the inferior voting class “A” and the 
superior voting class “B”. “A” shares carry one vote per share, and are mainly issued 
to outside shareholders, while “B” shares carry multiple votes per share, and are 
generally held by corporate insiders, such as founders, directors, senior officers and 
people having close connections with them. In this security-voting structure, “B” shares 
are also called multiple voting shares. Alternatively, class “A” may consist of non-
voting ordinary shares or non-voting preference shares with increased dividend rights, 
while “B” shares carry one vote each.9 
Another form of dual class structures is priority shares. These shares confer on 
their holders special decision or veto rights, irrespective of the proportion of their equity 
stakes.10 A common structure is that a fixed number or percentage (usually a majority) 
of directors are elected by the holders of priority shares and others by the remaining 
shareholders.11 Alternatively, some companies issuing formally one class of shares 
                                                 
7 HKEx (n 5 above). 
8 “SFC statement on the SEHK’s draft proposal on weighted voting rights” (25 June 2015), available at 
https://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-announcements/news/doc?refNo=15PR69 
(visited 17 October 2015). See also HKEx, “Consultation Conclusions to Concept Paper on Weighted 
Voting Rights” (June 2015). 
9 HKEx (n 5 above) para 140; Deminor Rating, “Application of the One Share-One Vote Principle in 
Europe” (March 2005) p 3. Preference shares with guaranteed dividend rights are excluded because they 
have some key characteristics of debt.  
10  Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Shearman & Sterling LLP and European Corporate 
Governance Institute (ECGI), “Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union” (2007) p 
8. 
11 HKEx (n 5 above) paras 137–139. 
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grant special control rights to particular persons through provisions in their 
constitutions. Besides enhanced director election rights, corporate constitutions may 
provide that certain shareholders have veto rights over control transactions, or that their 
presence be necessary for the quorum for a board meeting.12 In comparison with typical 
dual class structures where “B” shares have general superior voting rights, these 
governance structures attach “B” shares’ privilege to specific matters.  
There are few doubts that dual class structures are prevalent in developed 
economies. US corporate insiders can make use of all forms of dual class structures 
mentioned above to leverage their voting rights.13 Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) 
find that about six per cent of all companies listed in the United States issue shares with 
unequal votes, and they comprise about eight per cent of the overall US stock market 
capitalization.14 In the 16 EU member states studied by ISS et al. (2007), multiple 
voting shares, non-voting ordinary shares, and priority shares are available in eight, five, 
and nine jurisdictions respectively.15 Of all sample listed companies, 24 per cent issue 
multiple voting shares, and non-voting ordinary shares and priority shares are found 
respectively in one and two per cent of these companies.16 
III. The Three-Layer Analytical Framework 
In accordance with the logical sequence of the governance effects that dual class share 
structures achieve, their advantages and disadvantages can be sorted into three layers. 
                                                 
12 Ibid. paras 143–146. 
13 Shearman & Sterling LLP, “Proportionality between Ownership and Control in EU Listed Companies: 
Comparative Legal Study” (2007), Exhibit B, p 3.  
14 Gompers et al. (n 2 above) p 1053. 
15 ISS et al. (n 10 above) p 15. It should be noted that the prevalence of dual class structures in the 16 EU 
member states is underestimated in this article. ISS et al. (2007) also research “non-voting preference 
shares” which may grant higher or guaranteed dividend rights. Since preference shares with guaranteed 
dividend rights are not considered as a form of dual class structures in this article due to the reason 
explained in note 9, ISS et al.’s (2007) findings on “non-voting preference shares” are not reported. Ibid. 
p 7. 
16 Ibid. p 25. 
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First, corporate insiders adopt dual class structures with the purpose of becoming or 
continuing as controlling shareholders. Hence we need to explore the pros and cons of 
a controlling shareholder structure (CS) compared to a governance structure with 
dispersed ownership and no controlling shareholder (NCS). Second, CS structures can 
be achieved by two ways: corporate insiders may either have concentrated ownership 
of a single class company or hold a dominant portion of voting rights without 
proportionate cash flow rights. Hence we need to explore the pros and cons of voting-
cash flow rights separation compared to a concentrated ownership structure. Third, 
voting-cash flow rights separation can be achieved by many control-enhancing 
mechanisms (CEMs) in addition to dual class structures, such as pyramids, cross-
shareholdings, and security derivatives in the market for corporate votes. Hence we 
need to explore the pros and cons of dual class structures compared to other CEMs. 
IV. CS Structures and NCS Structures 
A company’s public shareholders generally do not engage in the management though 
they may commit a great amount of capital to the company. Consequently, corporate 
controllers may devote insufficient efforts to corporate affairs or pursue goals other 
than shareholder value, i.e. “shirking”;17 worse still, they may loot shareholder wealth 
by transferring corporate resources to their own pockets, i.e. “tunnelling”.18  
In a widely-held company without a controlling block of votes, if managers run 
the business inefficiently or tunnel corporate resources, shareholders can intervene in 
fundamental business decisions or even replace incumbent management without its 
                                                 
17 Mark J. Roe, “Corporate Law’s Limits” (2002) 31 J Legal Stud 233, 235. 
18 The term “tunnelling” derives from a well-known paper with the same title. See Simon Johnson, Rafael 
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, “Tunnelling” (2000) NBER Working Paper 
No 7523, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7523 (visited 11 February 2015). For a discussion 
about various kinds of tunnelling behaviour, see Vladimir Atanasov, Bernard Black and Conrad S. 
Ciccotello, “Law and Tunneling” (2011) 37 The Journal of Corporation Law 1. 
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consent by mounting a proxy battle for directorial positions or by selling the control to 
a hostile bidder. In addition, shareholders may simply sell their shares in the market to 
avoid further losses, which will drive the price down and ultimately attract a control 
bidder. On the contrary, in a company where insiders hold a dominant portion of votes, 
management suffers little exposure to outside shareholder monitoring, proxy contests 
and hostile takeovers, which inevitably increases corporate controllers’ ability to 
exploit outside shareholders. The positive effects of a takeover threat on corporate 
performance are proved by both theoretical models and some empirical evidence.19 
However, shareholder monitoring and control contestability may distort optimal 
management decisions, and thus diminish firm value. Firstly, thanks to their positions, 
managers usually have better information about the company than outside 
shareholders.20 When shares are dispersedly held, shareholders may sell control to a 
hostile bidder because of their mistaken belief or lack of information about the 
company’s current performance or prospects. 21  Consequently, management has to 
employ costly signalling devices to convince shareholders that the current utilization of 
corporate resources is optimal.22 In many cases, such communication of information is 
impossible or difficult because value-maximizing projects may require substantial 
secrecy for competitive reasons or generate no substantial profits until sometime in 
future. 23  When the costs of communicating private information are too large, 
management may choose more visible projects whose value can be more easily seen by 
shareholders, instead of value-maximizing ones. 24  A theoretical model shows that 
                                                 
19 Burkart and Lee (n 2 above) p 25; Adams and Ferreira (n 2 above) pp 69–72. 
20 Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder 
Choice” (1988) 76 Cal L Rev 1, 11. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Daniel R. Fischel, “Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock” (1987) 
54 U Chi L Rev 119, 138. 
23 Gordon (n 20 above) p 11. 
24 Fischel (n 22 above) p 138. 
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managers have less initiative in certain activities, such as searching for new investment 
opportunities, when outside shareholders are likely to interfere and remove them.25 This 
may even sometimes lead to managerial myopia: managers may pursue projects that 
favour short-term earnings over long-term interests of the company to avoid being 
undervalued and replaced.26  
Secondly, managers have fewer incentives to invest in firm-specific human 
capital when they perceive high risks of being replaced against their will. 27  For 
managers, the internal labour market within a particular company is different from the 
external one across all companies. 28  Since every company has its own important 
characteristics, a manager is expected to invest her time and resources to gain specific 
knowledge and skills concerning the particular company that she serves. Firm-specific 
knowledge and skills can increase managers’ value to a particular company, but do not 
affect their value in the external labour market.29 Therefore, a manager is willing to 
acquire such knowledge and skills only when she can obtain some rewards for doing so 
from the company she currently belongs to. However, the value of managerial firm-
specific investments is not observable in a short time period since future contingencies 
out of managers’ control have large impacts on corporate performance.30 As a result, it 
is unlikely for managers and shareholders to conclude an ex-ante explicit contract 
specifying the remuneration for firm-specific investments. When the observation period 
enlarges, it becomes easier to discern the impact of firm-specific investments on 
corporate performance because positive and negative random events tend to cancel one 
                                                 
25 Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb and Fausto Panunzi, “Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of 
the Firm” (1997) 112 Quarterly Journal of Economics 693. 
26 Burkart and Lee (n 2 above) p 27. 
27 Fischel (n 22 above) p 137. 
28 Gordon (n 20 above) p 18. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. pp 15, 18. 
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another out over time. 31  Hence the remuneration for managerial firm-specific 
investments normally takes the form of long-period employment. In a company with an 
NCS structure, managers always run the risk that their employment will be terminated 
by ill-informed shareholders or a hostile bidder who gains control from them, which 
decreases managers’ incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital. 
When shareholder monitoring and control contestability are weaken by the 
existence of a controlling shareholder, the various costs resulting from information 
communication are lower, managers have more incentives to make firm-specific 
investments, and companies are more likely to adopt business strategies that generate 
long-term profits. There is empirical evidence indicating the benefits of managerial 
entrenchment.32 
V. Voting-Cash Flow Rights Separation and Concentrated Ownership Structures 
When a CS structure tailors more to a company’s specific governance and business 
needs, the company has a choice in a free market: deviating from the one share-one 
vote principle or having concentrated corporate ownership. 
5.1. Voting-Cash Flow Rights Divergence and Diminution in Firm Value 
A CS structure under one share-one vote, which implies concentrated ownership of a 
single class company, establishes a strong link between controlling shareholders’ 
control power and their personal wealth within the company. Thanks to their large 
shareholding, the exercise of discretionary power by controlling shareholders is, to a 
large extent, confined in a way that also benefits non-controlling shareholders and the 
company as a whole, since the benefits of efficient operations and the costs of tunnelling 
                                                 
31 Ibid. pp 16, 18. 
32 Burkart and Lee (n 2 above) pp 26–27. 
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and shirking behaviours are both proportionately and thus largely enjoyed and borne by 
controlling shareholders. When controlling shareholders reduce their ownership of the 
company, they can externalize the costs of inefficient operations to non-controlling 
shareholders, but become more susceptible to outside shareholder monitoring, proxy 
contests and hostile takeovers. 
When voting rights are decoupled from cash flow rights, corporate control is 
disconnected from controlling shareholders’ interests associated with the company as a 
whole. This reduces controlling shareholders’ incentives to maximize shareholder 
wealth while increases their incentives to exploit non-controlling shareholders. 
Theoretical models demonstrate that, as the fraction of equity necessary for retaining 
control decreases, controlling shareholders can extract more private benefits,33 and are 
more prone to make inefficient decisions on project choice, firm size, and control 
transfers. 34  Empirical evidence shows that voting-cash flow rights divergence is 
positively and significantly associated with excess CEO compensation, while 
negatively and significantly associated with the marginal value of corporate reserves, 
stock returns on acquisitions and the contribution of capital expenditures to firm 
value.35 Overall, Gompers et al. (2010) find a negative and significant relationship 
between voting-cash flow rights divergence and firm value.36    
However, concentrated ownership structures come with costs besides benefits. 
Simply put, there is always a tension between corporate control and equity financing 
under one share-one vote. 
5.2. Corporate Control and Equity Financing 
                                                 
33 Ibid. pp 22–24. 
34 Bebchuk et al. (n 2 above) pp 301–306.  
35 Masulis et al. (n 2 above) pp 1703–1716. 
36 Gompers et al. (n 2 above) p 1073. 
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Capital plays a key role in the business success of a company. Generally, companies 
can employ two instruments to raise capital: debt and equity. Since debt imposes on 
companies a heavy burden of interest payment, in many cases, companies prefer raising 
equity. Logically, there are two determinants of equity financing, i.e. corporate 
controllers’ willingness to sell equity and public investors’ willingness to purchase non-
controlling stakes. The latter, as recurrently argued by the well-known law and finance 
scholarship, is largely determined by the level of investor protection provided by law;37 
whereas the former has not been seriously treated by academia until recently.38 This 
article argues that corporate controllers are willing to sell equity when it does not result 
in their loss of corporate control. 
5.2.1. Control Value and “Good” Private Benefits of Control 
The dilemma confronting corporate controllers who want to seek additional capital 
from a stock market is that issuing equity to the public normally implies diluting their 
control power. Although companies are in great demand for capital, corporate control 
is so valuable that almost all corporate controllers are unwilling to put it in the public 
for grabs. The value of control may result from the “bad” private benefits that corporate 
controllers can extract by tunnelling company resources.39 However, even when law 
provides sufficient shareholder protection to make little shareholder expropriation 
feasible, control power is still extremely valuable to corporate controllers because, in 
                                                 
37 See generally, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, “Law 
and Finance” (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance” (2000) 58 
Journal of Financial Economics 3; Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Andrei Shleifer, “The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing” (2008) 88 Journal of Financial Economics 
430. 
38 In particular, Prof. Pacces makes a great contribution to this topic. See Alessio M. Pacces, Rethinking 
Corporate Governance: The Law and Economics of Control Powers (Routledge 2012). See also Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, “A Rent-protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control” (1999) NBER Working 
Paper No 7203, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7203 (visited 13 February 2015). 
39 Bebchuk (n 38 above) p 8. 
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many occasions, control power is a necessity for them to gain the “good” private 
benefits produced by their firm-specific investments. 
Part IV describes the situation where corporate controllers are pure managers, 
i.e. agents of shareholders. The existence of controlling shareholders reduces the risks 
of involuntary management replacement, and thus helps secure the remuneration for 
managerial firm-specific investments. In fact, corporate controllers act not only as 
agents of shareholders but also as entrepreneurs whose firm-specific investments, i.e. 
entrepreneurship, are crucial to corporate success. Entrepreneurs are precious creators 
who can foresee profitable business opportunities that other market participants do not 
appreciate and the market is hence unable to price.40 Therefore, whether the value of 
entrepreneurship is verifiable depends on the success of a company and the extent 
thereof.41 Combining with the fact that corporate performance is a noisy signal of the 
value of firm-specific investments, the characteristic of entrepreneurship makes it 
impossible for entrepreneurs to contract ex-ante and explicitly with outside 
shareholders for the remuneration for their firm-specific investments.42  
Obviously, entrepreneurs have no incentive to provide entrepreneurship unless 
they can possess its value. Owing to the unavailability of ex-ante explicit contracts, in 
the eyes of economists, an implicit agreement where both parties agree to a deferred 
remuneration for entrepreneurship emerges here.43 Such deferred remuneration cannot 
be considered as a source of shareholder expropriation, because it accounts for the 
                                                 
40 Pacces (n 38 above) p 16. 
41 Ibid. p 123. 
42 Ibid. pp 124–125. The markets’ inability to function in the initial stages of the development of a 
company before high financial returns are anticipated is regarded by Prof. Mayer as a market failure that 
should be resolved by private benefits that encourage investments in these stages. See Colin Mayer, 
“Firm Control” in Joachim Schwalbach (ed), Corporate Governance: Essays in Honor of Horst Albach 
(Springer 2001) p 85. 
43 For an insightful exposition of implicit agreements and their implications in the relationships between 
shareholders and other stakeholders, see Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers, “Breach of Trust 
in Hostile Takeovers” in Alan J. Auerbach (ed), Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences 
(University of Chicago Press 1988) pp 33–68. 
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surplus that would not be produced without it. In other words, the deferred remuneration 
supports entrepreneurship, and it neither accounts for existing market value nor leads 
to redistribution of the assets that a company have already acquired.44 This is the reason 
why it is regarded as “good” private benefits of control.45 Though it still invites further 
research on the real forms of such deferred remuneration in business life, some non-
pecuniary benefits are undoubtedly included, such as the psychic satisfaction of 
bringing a company to success,46 the promotion and protection of family names,47 and 
the social status of controlling a successful company.48 
Although “good” private benefits of control enhance corporate performance ex-
ante by encouraging firm-specific investments, they may become inefficient ex-post by 
hindering value-increasing control transfers. 49  The ongoing benefits brought by 
entrepreneurship may be exhausted sometime in future, and there may appear a more 
skilful control bidder under whose management more profits can be generated on the 
same business. Certainly, entrepreneurs will object to transferring control to other 
people unless their firm-specific investments are rewarded. This means, if an 
entrepreneur’s consent is necessary for a takeover, a part of the efficiency gains of the 
takeover, in whatever form the law permits and the entrepreneur is willing to accept, 
needs to be paid exclusively to the entrepreneur, rather than shared among all of the 
shareholders, and failure to do so will frustrate the takeover.  
Nevertheless, the above situation simply amounts to the enforcement of an 
implicit agreement where a deferred remuneration for entrepreneurship is agreed upon 
                                                 
44 Alessio M. Pacces, “Control Matters: Law and Economics of Private Benefits of Control” (2009) ECGI 
Law Working Paper No 131/2009, p 3, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448164 (visited 6 March 
2015). 
45 Pacces (n 38 above) p 16. 
46 Pacces (n 44 above) p 9. 
47 Mayer (n 55 above) p 81. 
48  Ronald J. Gilson, “Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Comparative Taxonomy” (2006) 199 Harv L Rev 1641, 1664.  
49 Pacces (n 44 above) p 3. 
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ex-ante by entrepreneurs and outside shareholders. The special benefits granted to an 
entrepreneur in a control transaction is merely one form of such deferred remuneration. 
Pacces (2012) provides a good overview of the whole story: 
“[W]hen private benefits involve neither distortion nor diversion of the 
firm’s surplus, they fill in the gaps of market (contractual) 
incompleteness. In other words, they account for some value that would 
have not been produced otherwise. Such a value depends on firm-
specific investments by the entrepreneur. In the jargon of contract theory, 
the same value is ‘nonverifiable’, and therefore it cannot be contracted 
upon at the outset. Ex-post, one might regret that private benefits 
provide no guarantee that firm (shareholder) value is always being 
maximized. But one should not forget that ex-ante, in the absence of 
those benefits, there would have been no firm (or, at least, not that one) 
and no value to maximize.”50 
By their very nature, the implicit agreements described earlier are unenforceable 
before courts; meanwhile, outside shareholders have strong incentives to breach such 
agreements in order to maximize their wealth ex-post. To keep the ability to enforce 
the implicit agreements by themselves, entrepreneurs must grasp corporate control in 
their own hands to rule out any redistribution of “good” private benefits through proxy 
contests and hostile takeovers. Therefore, parting with corporate control is never an 
option to entrepreneurs who still await remuneration for their firm-specific investments. 
Since the importance of entrepreneurship is common to most companies, we expect that 
corporate control is generally entrenched. This expectation is supported by the 
                                                 
50 Pacces (n 38 above) p 93. 
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empirical evidence indicating the predominance of concentrated ownership structures 
and CEMs in stock markets around the world, including in the developed economies 
with relatively good shareholder protection laws and hence restricted tunnelling 
opportunities.51 
5.2.2. One Share-One Vote and Inferior Corporate Investment Strategies 
Controlling shareholders’ resistance to relinquish corporate control may make 
companies adopt inferior investment strategies under the one share-one vote principle. 
Firstly, to avoid the dilution of its controllers’ control power, a company has to 
forego a profitable investment opportunity if pursuing the opportunity requires equity 
financing and its controllers have no sufficient personal wealth to maintain their 
controlling portion of equity. Moreover, the situation may not change even when the 
controlling shareholders have enough personal wealth, because purchasing more shares 
increases the unsystematic risk associated with their investment in the company.52 In 
consideration of their large shareholding and their human capital sunk in the company, 
the controlling shareholders have already borne a great amount of unsystematic risk, 
and a further increase in the risk is really not a favourable move.53 Consequently, the 
company’s future growth is restricted owing to its inability to invest in new profitable 
projects. 
A governance structure allowing voting-cash flow rights separation can solve 
the aforementioned underinvestment problems. A company with such a structure can 
                                                 
51 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, “Corporate Ownership Around the 
World” (1999) 54 The Journal of Finance 471; Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov and Larry H.P. Lang, 
“The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations” (2000) 58 Journal of Financial 
Economics 81; Adams and Ferreira (n 2 above) pp 54–56. 
52 Ronald J. Gilson, “Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes” (1987) 73 
Va L Rev 807, 828. Unsystematic risk is the risk associated with investment in a particular asset that 
could be eliminated by holding a diversified portfolio. 
53 Fischel (n 22 above) p 139. 
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sell extra cash flow rights to the public to get the capital necessary for financing a new 
project while retain voting rights in the hands of controlling shareholders. As a result, 
the pursuit of new profitable investment opportunities will not be obstructed by 
controlling shareholders’ desire to retain control power. Bauguess (2004) finds that dual 
class companies perform better in the seasoned equity offering market than they do 
when single class and also better than benchmark single class companies do. 54  In 
addition, dual class companies’ overall performance are slightly improved after they 
are recapitalized into dual class.55 
Secondly, a large equity stake held by controlling shareholders exacerbates their 
risk aversion. In order to avoid tying excessive risks to their investment, controlling 
shareholders may keep the company from pursing projects with higher risk but higher 
expected returns, and they may as well engage in empire-building activities, e.g. 
acquiring a wide variety of assets unnecessary for the company’s core business, to 
diversify corporate operations. However, unduly few corporate risks are always 
accompanied by low productivity.     
In a company with voting-cash flow rights separation, controlling shareholders 
can reduce risks to their investment by selling their cash flow rights to the public, rather 
than giving up risky investment projects or conducting empire-building activities. As a 
result, investment opportunities with highest net present value will be chosen, even 
though they are risky or generate no substantial profits until sometime in future.56 The 
corporate focus will also be strengthened. Bauguess et al. (2012) find that dual class 
companies whose controllers cash out a significant part of their economic ownership 
                                                 
54 Bauguess (n 2 above) pp 99–110. A single class company is selected as the benchmark for each sample 
dual class company on the basis of the latter’s industry classification and market capitalization. Ibid. p 
66. 
55 Ibid. pp 88–89.  
56 Fischel (n 22 above) pp 139–140. 
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expand corporate core operations and divest non-core ones after becoming dual class, 
while benchmark single class companies keep large investment in both core and non-
core business activities. 57  In addition, these dual class companies have greater 
profitability and higher capital expenditures after becoming dual class, and they also 
outperform benchmark single class companies.58 
5.3. An Explanation for Different Findings of Event Studies and Valuation Regression 
Studies in the United States 
US scholars have conducted deep and extensive empirical research on US dual class 
listed companies. They mainly use two methodologies: event studies and valuation 
regressions. The former aim at uncovering share price reactions to announcements of 
changes in security-voting structures, i.e. dual class recapitalizations; 59  the latter 
regress book-to-market ratio60 or Tobin’s q ratio61 as proxies for firm value on measures 
of voting-cash flow rights divergence and control variables. 62  Since event studies 
require data on the performance and market price of a company before the event date, 
they can only study companies implementing relevant changes after going public. 
Hence the sample size in event studies is much smaller than in valuation regression 
studies.63 
There is a manifest distinction among research findings. Event studies generally 
document that firm value increases or remains the same when companies are 
                                                 
57 Bauguess et al. (n 2 above) pp 1251–1252. 
58 Ibid. p 1251. 
59 A listed company can alter its constitution to adopt a dual class structure either at the time of its IPO 
or sometime after its shares are publicly traded. The latter is termed by academia as a “dual class 
recapitalization”. 
60 For its definition, see http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/booktomarketratio.asp (visited 12 June 
2015).  
61 For its definition, see http://www.investopedia.com/terms/q/qratio.asp (visited 12 June 2015).  
62 Adams and Ferreira (n 2 above) pp 62–63. 
63 Cf Bauguess (n 2 above) p 64; Gompers et al. (n 2 above) p 1057. 
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recapitalized into dual class,64 while almost all valuation regression studies suggest that 
voting-cash flow rights divergence reduces firm value. 65  The analysis of the 
relationship between corporate control and corporate investment strategies in Section 
5.2 may provide some insights into the differences in these empirical results.66 
Valuation regression studies examine the pure effect of voting-cash flow rights 
divergence on firm value, and what they actually find is that, other things being equal, 
an increase in a wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights results in a decrease 
in firm value. The problem, from the perspective of policy-making, is that other things 
are never equal. Without an instrument to decouple voting rights from cash flow rights, 
controlling shareholders may forego valuable investment opportunities or diversify 
corporate operations, which they would not do otherwise. In other words, valuation 
regression studies can justify the prohibition of dual class structures if, when there is 
no voting-cash flow rights separation, controlling shareholders are willing to make the 
same decisions as they do under dual class structures, which requires that they pursue 
investment opportunities irrespective of the dilution of their control power or increased 
risks to their investment. Put in the analytical framework of corporate control 
established by Pacces (2009, 2012), 67  the findings of valuation regression studies 
represent the ex-post inefficiency of dual class structures which, nevertheless, cannot 
be used to deny their ex-ante efficiency.  
On the contrary, event studies examine share price reactions to announcements 
of dual class recapitalizations, and thus the effects of all things around dual class 
structures on firm value, including, for example, the impact of a profitable investment 
                                                 
64 For example, Bauguess (n 2 above); Bauguess et al. (n 2 above). 
65 For example, Gompers et al. (n 2 above); Masulis et al. (n 2 above). 
66 It should be noted that I lack a statistical background. What follows is my deductive analysis of the 
relevant empirical studies. 
67 Pacces (n 38 above); Pacces (n 44 above). 
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project that controlling shareholders might forgo under a single class structure. This 
situation reveals the endogenous nature of dual class recapitalizations: a company may 
change its security-voting structure when it anticipates positive performance effects 
derived from a new profitable investment project.68 Consequently, we do not know 
whether the dual class structure or the investment project or both contribute to the 
increased firm value. As endogeneity mingles effects of different variables together, it 
is certainly a big concern to scholars who try to find the truth. However, it seems strange 
that policy-makers also worry about endogeneity so much.69 If a dual class structure is 
necessary for a company to pursue new investment opportunities, then policy-makers 
do not need to consider which one enhances firm value when making rules of dual class 
structures. What really reduces event studies’ utility to policy-makers is their limited 
sample size.  
In a word, one source of the differences in the findings of event studies and 
valuation regression studies is their different research scope of dual class share 
structures. A strong support for this explanation is the fact that Gompers et al. (2010) 
find no significant relationships between dual class status and stock returns,70  nor 
between dual class status and firm value;71 that is, different verdicts are given to dual 
class structures by the representative valuation regression study when the authors shift 
their focus from the effect of voting-cash flow rights divergence to the one of dual class 
status.72  
                                                 
68 Adams and Ferreira (n 2 above) pp 64–65, 84–85.  
69 HKEx (n 5 above), Appendix IV, para 34.  
70 Gompers et al. (n 2 above) pp 1060–1061. 
71 Ibid. p 1073. 
72 However, it should be noted that the authors argue that the non-significant relationship between dual 
class status and stock returns indicates the fact that investors knew what they were buying due to their 
substantial knowledge of dual class companies from the relevant academic debate and regulatory scrutiny 
in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s. See ibid. pp 1060–1061.   
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The paramount reason why this article focuses on the literature about US dual 
class listed companies is that the United States is well known for its high-quality 
shareholder protection laws and fierce market competition, and hence “neither 
distortion nor diversion of the firm’s surplus” can be committed without reasonable 
limits by an US corporate controller, which is a precondition for “good” private 
benefits—the foundation stone of the analysis in Section 5.2—to function properly.73 
In comparison, in developing economies with a low level of shareholder protection, 
firm value is significantly and negatively related to not only voting-cash flow rights 
divergence but also the existence of CEMs.74 Therefore, this explanation simply points 
out that dual class structures are efficient when adopted for proper business purposes. 
Interestingly, the United States appears to be a perfect counter-example of the 
analysis in Section 5.2. Indeed, the United States is famous for entrepreneurial spirits, 
whereas it is characterized by the rare existence of controlling shareholders in its listed 
companies.75 It seems difficult to explain why US entrepreneurs put control in the 
public, in consideration of the great value of entrepreneurship. The answer is, however, 
simple: they do not.  
The strong directorial autonomy popular among corporate America leads to the 
unique US-style control-cash flow rights separation, which generally enables an US 
entrepreneur to secure corporate control even when all equity is issued to public 
investors.76 Simply put, US corporate laws assign the dominant part of corporate power 
to the board of directors and allows the board to implement anti-takeover devices. The 
                                                 
73 Pacces (n 38 above) pp 113–115. 
74 Karl V. Lins, “Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets” (2003) 38 The Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 159. 
75 Marco Becht, “Beneficial Ownership in the United States” in Fabrizio Barca and Marco Becht (eds), 
The Control of Corporate Europe (Oxford University Press 2002) 291. 
76 This point is not discussed in detail since it goes beyond the scope of this article. For detailed and 
insightful expositions of this point, see Sofie Cools, “The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the 
United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers” (2005) 30 Del J Corp L 697, 738–750, 
755–757; Pacces (n 38 above) pp 178–187. 
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former grants the board a powerful and irresistible position against dispersed 
shareholders and the latter precludes the emergence of a hostile controlling shareholder. 
As a result, US entrepreneurs normally do not need to worry about losing control as 
long as they appoint themselves and / or their allies as directors before equity financing. 
They can thereby guarantee the rewards for their firm-specific investments, without the 
need to fetter their companies’ pursuit of valuable investment projects, as exactly in the 
case of a dual class company. 
VI. Dual Class Share Structures and Other Control-Enhancing Mechanisms 
If a company prefers voting-cash flow rights separation due to its specific governance 
and business needs, it must decide what CEM to employ.  
6.1. Pyramids, Cross-Shareholdings and the Market for Corporate Votes 
Three commonly used CEMs besides dual class share structures are pyramids, cross-
shareholdings and security derivatives in the market for corporate votes. 
Two simple examples briefly illustrate how pyramidal and cross-ownership 
structures separate voting rights from cash flow rights.77 Assume that Mr Smith is the 
controller of companies A and B which both formally comply with one share-one vote. 
In a pyramidal structure, Mr Smith holds 50 per cent of A’s equity, and A in turn holds 
50 per cent of B’s equity. Consequently, Mr Smith effectively controls company B with 
only 25 per cent of its cash flow rights. In a cross-ownership structure, Mr Smith holds 
25 per cent of A’s and B’s shares respectively, and the two companies hold another 25 
per cent of the equity of each other. Mr Smith’s control over the two companies is hence 
entrenched, while he has only one-third cash flow rights of the whole group.78 Both 
                                                 
77 For the mathematical models of voting-cash flow rights separation in pyramidal and cross-ownership 
structures, see Bebchuk et al. (n 2 above) pp 298–300. 
78 Ibid. p 300. 
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pyramids and cross-shareholdings can further enlarge a wedge between voting rights 
and cash flow rights by linking more companies.  
Stock lending is a prominent example of derivative techniques in the market for 
corporate votes that can decompose one share-one vote. In a stock lending transaction, 
a borrower purchases a lender’s shares under an agreement that the borrower is obliged 
to sell equivalent shares back to the lender in future. Since the ownership of the shares 
is transferred temporarily to the borrower, the borrower can exercise related votes in a 
certain period of time, but she is liable under the agreement to pay to the lender the 
dividends or other distributions on the shares during the “loan” period. The lender may 
also charge some fees. Though stock lending is typically employed to facilitate short 
selling, a corporate insider can utilize it to gain enough voting rights to push through a 
desired proposal during a general meeting of shareholders.79 
In addition, a corporate insider who seeks to circumvent one share-one vote may 
also use a “zero-cost” collar, which involves buying a put option of her shares and 
simultaneously selling a call option.80 A put option gives its owner the contractual right, 
but not the obligation, to sell a specified amount of an underlying security at a specified 
price within a specified time / on a specified date, and a call option gives its owner the 
right to buy securities. The collar can thus limit downside loss with “zero cost” in the 
sense that the payment for the put option is offset by the proceeds from the sale of the 
call option.81 As a result, the insider’s voting rights are retained while her cash flow 
exposure is reduced. 82  A similar effect can be achieved through a short-position 
                                                 
79 Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, “Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and 
Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership” (2007) 13 Journal of Corporate 
Finance 343, 350. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. p 367. 
82 Khachaturyan (n 2 above) p 354. 
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shareholding.83 The insider can sell short a number of shares amounting to part of her 
shareholding,84 and thereby become economically interested merely in the remaining 
part of her shareholding, with retaining the votes attached to all her shares, until her 
obligation to return the “borrowed” shares is due. 
6.2. Disadvantages of Other Control-Enhancing Mechanisms 
Like valuation regression studies of dual class share structures, most empirical studies 
of pyramids and cross-shareholdings find that voting-cash flow rights divergence 
caused by these CEMs is significantly and negatively related to firm value.85 However, 
pyramids and cross-shareholdings have their own disadvantages, compared to dual 
class structures. 
Firstly, pyramidal and cross-ownership structures are quite complex and opaque 
in the real world.86 These structures lengthen agency chains in a corporate group, and 
make it difficult for public investors to know who the ultimate controllers of their 
investments are. 87  The controllers of a complicated corporate group have more 
opportunities to exploit non-controlling shareholders by engaging in tunnelling 
transactions which are difficult to detect and analyse in such a group.88  The rare 
existence of complex organizational structures is believed to be an important factor in 
the relatively low level of tunnelling in the United States.89 Secondly, pyramids and 
                                                 
83 Ibid. 
84 Short selling is the sale of a security that the seller has “borrowed”. The “borrowing” process is the 
same as a stock lending transaction. Available at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortselling.asp 
(visited 12 May 2015).  
85 For a good overview of the relevant literature, see Adams and Ferreira (n 2 above) pp 66–69.  
86 For real examples of pyramidal and cross-ownership structures, see La Porta et al. (n 51 above) pp 
481–491; ISS et al. (n 10 above) pp 36–80; Bebchuk et al. (n 2 above) pp 299–301. 
87 Bryane Michael and Say Goo, “Last of the Tai-Pans: Improving the Sustainability of Long-Term 
Financial Flows by Improving Hong Kong’s Corporate Governance” (2013) AIIFL Working Paper No 
16, p 18, available at http://www.aiifl.com/ (visited 13 May 2015). 




cross-shareholdings have negative effects on liquidity of securities markets. 90  For 
example, in the pyramidal control chain established by Mr Smith, the direct stake of 
company A in company B ties up 50 per cent of the latter’s shares which are thus 
unavailable for public trading.91  
In contrast, dual class structures are simple and transparent. It is a child’s play 
to calibrate the wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights in a dual class 
structure.92 When no other CEMs are employed, public investors can easily discern the 
controllers of a dual class company. Tunnelling transactions are less likely to escape 
market and legal scrutiny. Moreover, dual class structures can even facilitate liquidity 
because more equity can be sold to the public without affecting corporate control. In 
addition, a corollary of the simplicity of dual class structures is that, other things being 
equal, the administrative costs of a dual class company are lower than those of a 
pyramidal or cross-ownership corporate group.  
The central problem of security derivatives in the market for corporate votes is 
that they can be utilized to establish or reinforce an insider’s control over a company 
after its equity is issued to the public. Consequently, investors are unable to discount 
share price for the increased risks of shareholder expropriation. On the contrary, with 
regard to dual class IPOs, outside shareholders know what they are purchasing and 
insiders have to bear a market penalty for voting-cash flow rights separation.93 Even 
regarding complicated pyramidal and cross-ownership structures, outside shareholders 
at least have an opportunity to understand the organization of a corporate group if they 
put in enough efforts.    
                                                 
90 Marco Becht, “European Corporate Governance: Trading off Liquidity against Control” (1999) 43 
European Economic Review 1071, 1073. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Bebchuk et al. (n 2 above) p 297. 
93 Henry T. C. Hu and Bernard Black, “The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) 
Ownership” (2006) 79 S Cal L Rev 811, 858. 
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The same problem is found in dual class recapitalizations as well.94 However, 
in many aspects, security derivatives perform worse. First, dual class recapitalizations 
at least require shareholder approval for they entail alterations to corporate constitutions, 
but engaging in derivative transactions does not because it is a purely private decision.95 
Second, a dual class recapitalization is a one-time adjustment after which corporate 
control is known, and subsequent investors can pay a discounted price for inferior 
voting shares. 96  But a new corporate controller may emerge through derivative 
transactions anytime. Most important, as explained in Section 7.3, the aforementioned 
problem associated with dual class recapitalizations can be solved by proper regulations, 
thanks to the simplicity of dual class structures.  
Another big problem is that a shareholder, by using security derivatives, may 
have negative economic interests in the company with retaining her voting rights.97 For 
instance, she may sell short more shares than those she owns. Therefore, she will vote 
for value-destruction resolutions to make a profit from the decline of share price.98 In 
addition, due to the private nature of derivative transactions, their utilization is less 
transparent.99 This is believed to be an important reason why decoupling voting rights 
from cash flow rights via the market for corporate votes has not yet been extensively 
studied by academia.100  
Despite their disadvantages, pyramids, cross-shareholdings and security 
derivatives have important functions that make a policy prohibiting them unreasonable. 
                                                 
94 See Section 6.3 below. 
95 Hu and Black (n 93 above) p 860. 
96 Hu and Black (n 79 above) p 358. 
97 Khachaturyan (n 2 above) p 354. 
98 For real examples supporting the argument, see Hu and Black (n 93 above) pp 825, 828–829, 834–835. 
Regulators may mitigate this problem, to some extent, by prohibiting “naked” short selling, i.e. selling a 
share short without first borrowing it or ensuring that it can be borrowed. Securities and Futures 
Ordinance (Cap 571), s 170. 
99 Regulators may mitigate this problem, to some extent, by requiring market participants to disclose 
short positions. Securities and Futures (Short Position Reporting) Rules (Cap 571AJ). 
100 Adams and Ferreira (n 2 above) p 73. 
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A corporate group can create internal markets for capital, labour and talent within the 
group, in order to make up for the defects of external market institutions.101 It may also 
create a group reputation for risk-sharing that the group-affiliated companies will 
support each other.102 In developing economies with weak rule of law, intra-group 
transactions may be an attractive alternative to inefficient formal contract enforcement 
mechanisms, e.g. a corrupt and incompetent judicial system.103 Stock lending, put and 
call options and short selling are all important financial activities, contributing to 
greater liquidity of securities markets. They also help market participants to hedge their 
risks and thus improve the levels of risk-sharing in modern commercial industries.    
Nevertheless, the advantages of these CEMs, except for risk-sharing, are outside 
the context of voting-cash flow rights separation. Due to the key characteristics of a 
company, its controllers may need merely to separate their voting rights from their cash 
flow rights for the benefits delineated in Section 5.2, but they may desire neither to 
create internal markets nor to participate in derivative markets. In this situation, a ban 
on dual class structures compels corporate controllers to use pyramids, cross-
shareholdings or derivative transactions, which generates high efficiency costs by 
virtue of these CEMs’ drawbacks that could otherwise be avoided if dual class 
structures were permitted. 
6.3. Disadvantages of Dual Class Share Structures 
Compared to other CEMs, dual class share structures have two disadvantages. The first 
one is straightforward: a controller of a dual class company can decouple voting rights 
from cash flow rights infinitely. In theory, the corporate controller can hold all of the 
                                                 
101 Tarun Khanna and Yishay Yafeh, “Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?” 
(2007) 45 Journal of Economic Literature 331, 335–341. 
102 Ibid. p 348. 




voting rights with no economic interests in the company through various dual class 
structures. She may issue voting shares with no cash flow rights to herself and non-
voting shares to the public; moreover, she may hold priority shares to which all decision 
rights are attached and issue ordinary shares to public investors, or the company’s 
constitution may stipulate that she possesses all decision rights.  
There exist some natural constraints on voting-cash flow rights divergence 
arising from other CEMs. In pyramidal and cross-ownership structures, corporate 
controllers need to link more companies to enlarge wedges between voting rights and 
cash flow rights in certain companies. This requires public investment in other group 
members. Decoupling voting rights from cash flow rights through stock lending and 
short selling requires a sufficient supply of shares for “borrowing” in securities markets. 
Shareholders who want to influence corporate decisions are unlikely to “lend” their 
shares to others. The voting power of a corporate insider who utilizes short selling and 
collars is unable to exceed the number of the shares that she holds. 
Some commentators may argue that policy-makers do not need to worry about 
the issue of infinite voting-cash flow rights divergence, because it is subject to market 
scrutiny: investors will simply not buy the shares of a dual class company whose 
controllers have only negligible cash flow rights. However, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that investors’ rationality should not be overestimated. Two best-known 
examples were Dodge Brothers, Inc. and Industrial Rayon Corporation. The former 
solicited public investment of US$130 million, while its controlling bank purchased a 
majority of the superior voting shares for mere US$2.25 million; the latter’s insiders 
took the full control with mere 0.33 per cent of the whole equity.104 No proper business 
                                                 
104 Joel Seligman, ‘Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote 
Controversy’ (1986) 54 Geo Wash L Rev 687, 694; William Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company 1927) pp 86–87. 
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purposes or strategies could justify such unreasonable wedges between voting rights 
and cash flow rights, but amazingly, investors were still willing to invest in the two 
companies. In fact, the two examples were used by an influential scholar, Prof. William 
Ripley, to enhance his opposition to dual class structures, who was invited to the White 
House to discuss the subject by Calvin Coolidge, the then President of the United 
States.105 In consideration of, inter alia, the high-level participation of retail investors 
in the HK securities markets,106 HK securities regulators should take seriously the 
possibility of extreme voting-cash flow rights divergence caused by a dual class 
structure. 
The second disadvantage of dual class share structures is about dual class 
recapitalizations: a listed company may alter its constitution to become dual class after 
its equity is issued to the public. Typical dual class recapitalization mechanisms are 
“exchange offers”, “pro rata dividends”, and “time-phased voting plans”.  
The former two mechanisms require a constitution amendment that authorizes 
the issuance of a new class of superior voting shares. Then in exchange offers, 
shareholders are given a finite period of time to choose either to keep their existing 
shares or to exchange for superior voting shares. In most cases, increased dividend 
rights are granted to existing inferior voting shares, and a transfer of superior voting 
shares to anyone other than corporate insiders leads to an automatic loss of superior 
voting rights.107 In a pro rata dividend, the company pays a dividend in the form of 
superior voting shares to all shareholders. The number of superior voting shares a 
shareholder receives is proportionate to her shareholding at the time of the dividend 
payment. The restriction on transferring superior voting shares may or may not exist in 
                                                 
105 Seligman (n 104 above) p 695. 
106 HKEx, ‘Retail Investor Survey 2011’ (April 2012) p 1. 
107 Gordon (n 20 above) pp 40–41; Bauguess (n 2 above) pp 17–19.  
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this mechanism. 108  Recapitalizations through time-phased voting plans require a 
constitution amendment that gives multiple votes to shares acquired before the 
recapitalization date and held continuously thereafter, and to shares subsequently 
acquired and held continuously for a particular period. By the nature of this mechanism, 
a transfer of superior voting shares deprives them of their multiple votes. An exception 
is generally made for transfers to corporate insiders. 109 
Although dual class recapitalizations require shareholder approval, a thorough 
analysis of shareholder voting process reveals that shareholders’ approval of a 
recapitalization proposal does not necessarily support a belief that this decision 
increases shareholder wealth.110  
As explained in Parts IV and V, most positive and negative parts of dual class 
structures come from the same core characteristic, namely insider control combined 
with voting-cash flow rights separation, and thus attach to each other seamlessly. 
Consequently, it is a difficult task for public shareholders to evaluate a recapitalization 
proposal. Corporate insiders can make use of strategic behaviour to further complicate 
such evaluation and to distort shareholder choices towards what insiders favour.  
Firstly, corporate insiders can bundle a recapitalization proposal with an 
unrelated proposal independently desired by outside shareholders.111 For example, a 
company may announce that it will increase dividends paid to shareholders if the 
recapitalization proposal is passed but not otherwise. In exchange offer 
recapitalizations, increased dividend rights associated with inferior voting shares also 
act as a “sweetener”. Secondly, corporate insiders can threaten not to pursue new 
investment projects through issuing ordinary shares, declaring that they highly value 
                                                 
108 Gordon (n 20 above) pp 41–42; Bauguess (n 2 above) pp 19–21. 
109 Gordon (n 20 above) p 42; Bauguess (n 2 above) p 130.  
110 Gordon (n 20 above) pp 40–60. 
111 Ibid. p 48. 
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corporate control.112 Such a threat usually seems credible due to the reasons explained 
in Section 5.2. 
When the assessment of the effect of a recapitalization proposal is complex, 
collective action problems of shareholder voting function to guarantee the approval of 
the proposal. Owing to the small shareholding of an individual public shareholder, the 
costs of obtaining sufficient knowledge and information in order to make a sensible 
choice usually exceed the expected return. Hence a shareholder normally votes for a 
recapitalization proposal without careful consideration. 113  Even when some public 
shareholders determine that the proposal will diminish shareholder wealth, they do not 
have incentives to organize opposition. Their gains from the defeat of the proposal are 
proportionate to their shareholding, whereas their expenditure on organization is 
unlikely to be reimbursed by other shareholders.114 In this situation, waiting for others 
to do the work is a better choice. 
In a word, shareholder approval of a dual class recapitalization may result not 
from its quality, but from collective action and strategic choice problems of shareholder 
voting. Then comes the next problem: some dual class recapitalization mechanisms, 
once approved, can deprive existing shareholders of their voting rights, regardless of 
their true wills and without due compensations.  
Time-phased voting plans entail a restriction on transfers of superior voting 
shares. Consequently, voting rights held by existing shareholders cannot be priced by 
securities markets, and voting power of corporate insiders becomes stronger as outside 
shareholders adjust their investment portfolios.  
                                                 
112 Ibid. pp 49–50. 
113 Ibid. pp 43–44. 
114 Ibid. p 44. 
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Exchange offers coerce existing shareholders to give up their voting rights even 
when no restriction is imposed on transfers of superior voting shares. Collective action 
problems always make it the optimal strategy for a public shareholder to maintain her 
inferior voting shares.115 If so many public shareholders exchange for superior voting 
shares that corporate insiders are unable to entrench their control, an individual 
shareholder gains more by refusing the exchange. She can thereby obtain the increased 
dividend rights and free-ride other shareholders’ efforts against managerial 
opportunism. If insufficient public shareholders exchange for superior voting shares, 
she is still better off to refuse the exchange. Despite the increased agency risks, she at 
least gets a dividend preference. As a result, almost all shareholders will follow this 
strategy and voting rights will be concentrated in the hands of corporate insiders, though 
the optimal strategy for outside shareholders as a group may be to keep insiders from 
enhancing their control power. It should also be noted that the value of increased 
dividend rights attached to inferior voting shares is unlikely to correspond with the 
value of superior voting rights,116 owing to the absence of market pricing in exchange 
offer recapitalizations. 
In contrast, pro rata dividends without restrictions on transfers of superior 
voting shares do not infringe existing shareholders’ voting rights. Such a 
recapitalization does not vary the original distribution of voting power in a company, 
and shifts in the control distribution can only occur as a result of market transactions 
made by individual shareholders after the completion of the recapitalization. These 
analyses may explain the findings by Bauguess (2004) that share price reactions to dual 
class recapitalization announcements by exchange offer firms are negative and 
                                                 
115 Gilson (n 52 above) pp 833–834; Gordon (n 20 above) pp 57–58. 
116 Superior voting shares generally have 10 votes each, and inferior voting shares normally have extra 
10 per cent of dividend rights. Gordon (n 20 above) p 40. 
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significant, while recapitalizations by pro rata dividends, most of which impose no 
restriction on transferring superior voting shares,117 have non-negative effects on share 
prices.118 
VII. Law and Demerits of Dual Class Share Structures 
After analysing the merits and demerits of dual class share structures, policy-makers, 
who shape the legal and regulatory frameworks within which dual class companies are 
managed, need to explore the role that law can play in the control of the downside of 
dual class structures. 
As explained in Parts IV, V and VI, dual class structures have disadvantages 
respectively in each layer of the Framework. First, corporate controllers are not exposed 
to outside shareholder monitoring, and cannot be replaced through proxy contests or 
hostile takeovers. Second, corporate controllers have less incentive to maximize 
shareholder wealth (shirking), but more to divert company resources to their own 
pockets (tunnelling). Third, corporate controllers can separate voting rights from cash 
flow rights infinitely and employ certain dual class recapitalization mechanisms to 
deprive non-controlling shareholders of their voting rights. 
7.1. Illusory Advantages of NCS Structures  
In general, policy-makers do not necessarily need to deal with the drawbacks of dual 
class share structures compared to NCS structures, because the functions of proxy 
contests and hostile takeovers to discipline managerial inefficiency are, to a large extent, 
illusory in the real world.  
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Hostile takeovers are quite rare, not only from a worldwide perspective,119 but 
also in the United States and the United Kingdom where widely-held listed companies 
predominate.120 “In fact … unsolicited tender offers are so rare and sporadic that a 
director or manager who shirks his responsibilities by playing golf when he should be 
working is undoubtedly more likely to be struck by lightning while on the course than 
to be fired after a hostile takeover.”121 Moreover, hostile takeovers are usually not 
motivated by the need to replace inefficient management. UK evidence shows that the 
performance of targets of hostile takeovers is not significantly different from that of 
targets of friendly takeovers or non-acquired companies; 122  on the US part, poor 
corporate performance has little explanatory power about the probability of a company 
receiving a hostile bid.123 In fact, hostile takeovers are more likely to be caused by an 
acquiring company’s need to restructure its assets.124 
Shareholders have even less incentive to discipline managerial inefficiency 
through proxy contests than hostile takeovers.125 Both organizations of proxy contests 
and hostile takeovers are quite expensive. However, in hostile takeovers, a successful 
bidder can take possession of the largest part, if not all, of takeover gains; while in 
proxy contests, most efficiency gains derived from management replacement will be 
free-ridden by other shareholders who do not contribute to proxy solicitation. In 
practice, even if a proxy contest does take place, it usually constitutes a part of an entire 
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hostile takeover strategy.126 The same economic rationale applies to shareholders’ other 
monitoring behaviour.    
The disciplinary functions of NCS structures have even much less relevance to 
Hong Kong because of the undoubted concentrated corporate ownership in its stock 
market.127 Hence this article concentrates on laws and regulations that deal with dual 
class structures’ demerits in the second and third layers of the Framework. 
7.2. Law and Extreme Voting-Cash Flow Rights Divergence 
As explained in Section 6.3, a controller of a dual class company may decouple voting 
rights from cash flow rights infinitely, and anecdotal evidence suggests that market 
mechanisms alone are unable to solve this problem. It is thus necessary for policy-
makers to intervene. When controlling voting-cash flow rights divergence caused by 
multiple voting shares, policy-makers generally place limits on the maximum number 
of votes carried by a superior voting share. Among the EU member states studied by 
Shearman & Sterling LLP (2007), Denmark,128 France, Hungary, and Sweden adopt 
this approach.129 
It is worth noting that the basis for calculating a superior voting share’s votes 
does matter. For example, section 67(1) of the Danish Public Companies Act 2006 
(DPCA 2006) provided that the increase of the voting rights of a certain class of shares 
should not exceed 10 times the votes per unit of par value as compared to the votes held 
by the class of shares with the least voting rights per unit of par value; chapter 4, section 
5 of the Swedish Companies Act 2005 (SCA 2005) provides that no share may carry 
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voting rights which are more than 10 times greater than the voting rights of any other 
share. Although the two sections have the same effect in normal circumstances, a 
practice that once appeared in the HK securities market presents a serious challenge to 
the Swedish approach. 
In the 1970s when dual class listed companies were not prohibited in Hong 
Kong, seven companies conducted issuance of “B” shares to raise capital.130 These “B” 
shares carried one vote each, and thus had equal voting rights to the companies’ existing 
“A” shares. However, “B” shares entitled their holders to only a fraction of the dividend 
rights carried by “A” shares, and the par value of “B” shares were proportionately 
discounted.131 In comparison with purchasing “A” shares, a corporate insider could 
acquire multiple voting rights with the same amount of investment in the company by 
purchasing “B” shares. Assume that a Swedish company adopts the same capital 
structure, and that the par value of its “B” shares is less than one-tenth of the par value 
of its “A” shares. The company thereby decouples voting rights from cash flow rights 
to an extent exceeding what is actually allowed by the SCA 2005, while technically 
complying with the Act, because “B” shares and “A” shares both have one vote each. 
To prevent this situation, Swedish courts and regulators need to interpret chapter 4, 
section 5 of the SCA 2005 broadly. On the contrary, this situation will not arise under 
section 67(1) of the DPCA 2006. 
We can observe that the control of superior voting shares’ maximum votes is 
most effective when a calculation basis is connected with their economic elements 
instead of inferior voting shares’ votes. However, the approach of the DPCA 2006 
cannot be directly transplanted into jurisdictions which nowadays retire the concept of 
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par value, such as Sweden and Hong Kong. One solution to this problem is to use shares’ 
economic rights, e.g. dividend rights, as the basis for calculating a superior voting 
share’s votes. An example rule is that the voting rights of any share should not exceed 
10 times the votes per unit of its dividend rights as compared to the votes held by the 
class of shares with the least voting rights per unit of their dividend rights.  
Of course, to frustrate infinite voting-cash flow rights divergence, policy-
makers should consider as well other forms of dual class structures, besides multiple 
voting shares. The wording of chapter 4, section 5 of the SCA 2005 indicates that non-
voting shares are forbidden in Sweden.132 Moreover, pursuant to the SCA 2005, priority 
shares are available,133 but in a public company, more than 50 per cent of the directors 
should be appointed through general shareholders’ elections.134 The situation under the 
DPCA 2006 is the same.135 
It can be safely concluded that a system of rules regulating multiple voting 
shares, non-voting shares, and priority shares render impossible extreme voting-cash 
flow rights divergence in dual class companies. If Hong Kong permitted dual class 
listings in future and worried about possible infinite voting-cash flow rights divergence, 
it could adopt a rule similar to section 67(1) of the DPCA 2006 with a different 
calculation basis, and limit decision rights that can be assigned to priority shares and 
particular persons. 
7.3. Law and Coercive Dual Class Recapitalizations 
As explained in Section 6.3, some dual class recapitalization mechanisms enable 
corporate insiders to coerce existing shareholders to give up their voting rights; but 
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134 SCA 2005, cap 8, s 47. 
135 Shearman & Sterling LLP (n 13 above), Exhibit C, Part 1, pp 65–66, 71. 
37 
 
unfortunately, collective action and strategic choice problems of shareholder voting 
render public shareholders unable to prevent the infringement of their voting rights by 
voting down a dual class recapitalization proposal at a general meeting. This situation 
invites regulators to intervene. According to the Voting Rights Policy of the NYSE, 
dual class listings are generally permitted with one qualification: existing shareholders’ 
voting rights cannot be disparately reduced or restricted through any corporate action 
or issuance.136 In particular, the NYSE regards dual class recapitalizations by means of 
time-phased voting plans and exchange offers as inconsistent with the Policy.137 
The essence of the US regulatory approach is allowing companies that have 
already been controlled by insiders to raise equity from the public without affecting 
insider control, while forbidding companies that have already raised equity from the 
public to change their control distribution and to import insider control which does not 
exist at the beginning. In the former situation, the law protects the contracts concluded 
between controlling shareholders and public investors well informed of the situations 
they would be in after purchasing inferior voting shares; in the latter situation, the law 
eliminates controlling shareholders’ ability to alter unilaterally the terms on control 
distribution in a corporate contract. The US approach strikes a good balance between 
contractual freedom and fairness.  
The SEHK accepts the merits of the US regulatory approach, but it would place 
additional limitation on dual class listings if the current prohibition was removed: dual 
class structures should be restricted to new listing applicants only.138 It is believed that, 
following the midstream implementation of a dual class structure by an existing listed 
company, “the relative value and voting power of shares held by ordinary shareholders 
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would be lower than it had been prior to the re-structuring”.139 In contrast, investors 
engaging in a dual class IPO will not be unfairly treated since they purchase inferior 
voting shares “in full knowledge of the existence and terms of the [dual class] structure 
and any risks associated with it”.140 
However, this policy interferes somewhat too far in market freedom. Firstly, a 
ban on dual class recapitalizations that infringe existing shareholders’ voting rights 
suffices to protect the original positions of public shareholders in a listed company; 
whereas prohibition of all kinds of dual class recapitalizations may over-kill value-
increasing ones proposed by existing listed companies that need to adjust their security-
voting structures to changes of market conditions.  
Secondly, when restrictions on transfers of superior voting shares do not exist 
in a recapitalization mechanism, market pricing functions in the sale of superior voting 
shares by public shareholders just as it does in the purchase of inferior voting shares in 
a dual class IPO. Both the premium for superior voting rights and the discount for 
inferior voting rights act as compensations for increased agency risks, and both 
compensations are priced by securities markets. There is no reason for permitting dual 
class IPOs while prohibiting dual class recapitalizations without infringement of 
existing shareholders’ voting rights.  
The only justification for prohibiting all dual class recapitalizations seems to be 
the coercion inherent in the voting process of a recapitalization proposal. However, the 
coercion derives from collective action and strategic choice problems of shareholder 
voting generally, but does not from the characteristics of a recapitalization proposal. 
Corporate insiders can also take advantage of these shareholder voting problems to push 
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through other fundamental corporate changes, e.g. switches of a company’s core 
business and place of incorporation. Law generally allows these fundamental changes, 
subject to stringent procedural requirements, and dual class recapitalizations are not so 
special that should be treated differently. Therefore, this article suggests that Hong 
Kong should adopt a rule similar to the Voting Rights Policy of the NYSE if it permitted 
dual class listed companies someday. 
7.4. Law, Tunnelling and Shirking 
Tunnelling results in the non-pro rata distribution of corporate resources between 
corporate controllers and non-controlling shareholders which is not allowed by law. 
Law directly controls tunnelling behaviour, especially through the enforcement of 
corporate constitutions and corporate controllers’ fiduciary duties.141 On the other hand, 
shirking impairs the quality of business decisions which is generally not subject to legal 
scrutiny. Judicial evaluation of business decisions with no conflict of interests is 
normally disfavoured by an economy because, in a corporate context, judges are 
scarcely able to distinguish between “bad decisions and proper decisions that turn out 
badly”.142 
Firstly, business decisions are inevitably made on the basis of incomplete 
information and uncertainty of future contingencies,143 but people always judge them 
with hindsight. When a business decision ultimately causes loss, it is often regarded as 
negligent irrespective of its real quality, while the same decision would be considered 
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very clever if it turned out profitable because of changes in some factors outside 
corporate controllers’ control. For the sake of fairness, judges must form their opinions 
on the appropriateness of a business decision by reviewing the circumstances at the 
time when the decision was made, rather than its consequences. However, judges are 
not experts in business, and as outsiders to the company, they have even less 
information than its controllers do. 
Secondly, unlike other professional practices, entrepreneurship entails a great 
degree of uniqueness. Judges are not experts in medicine either, but they can evaluate 
the quality of a doctor’s decision by reference to a generally accepted standard of 
medical practices.144 However, there is not such a standard for entrepreneurs. The fact 
that other entrepreneurs would make different decisions in similar circumstances tells 
judges very little about a particular entrepreneur’s negligence.145 
Consequently, as for assessing the quality of a business decision, judges will do 
systematically worse than the company’s internal governance mechanism. Moreover, 
the above reasons also render accurate determination of damages almost impossible.146 
When there is large potential for judicial error, corporate controllers will make 
decisions with as few risks as possible in order to avoid legal disputes. Therefore, 
second-guessing business decisions regularly by courts will stifle innovation and 
entrepreneurship, and judges are supposed to leave the disputes over business decisions 
to the company’s internal governance mechanism. 
Put another way, corporate controllers need enough freedom to take action to 
maximize shareholder wealth. Meanwhile, the flip side of such freedom is to enable 
                                                 
144 Eisenberg (n 142 above) p 444. 
145 Pacces (n 38 above) p 250. 
146 Edward B. Rock and Michael L. Wachter, “Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-
Governing Corporation” (2001) 149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1619, 1651. For a real 
example, see Re Styland Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2012] 2 HKLRD 325 [145]. 
41 
 
corporate controllers to shirk their duties. The legal scrutiny strong enough to sweep all 
shirking behaviour away inevitably penalizes as well honest entrepreneurs’ attempts to 
maximize shareholder value that unluckily turn out a failure. It is thus preferable to 
preserve such freedom and having most shirking behaviour outside legal scrutiny is a 
necessary price to pay for fairness and efficiency. 
Intelligent judges are fully aware of the above story, and they generally show a 
great reluctance to get involved in business decisions without conflicts of interests. In 
the United States, this judicial attitude brings about the well-known “business judgment 
rule”:  
“[I]t is not [courts’] function to resolve for corporations questions of 
policy and business management. The directors are chosen to pass upon 
such questions and their judgment unless shown to be tainted with fraud 
is accepted as final. The judgment of the directors of corporations enjoys 
the benefit of a presumption that it was formed in good faith and was 
designed to promote the best interests of the corporation they serve.”147  
As a result, when the substance or quality of a business decision is called into question, 
US judges normally refuse to hold relevant directors liable for the decision’s bad 
outcomes.148 
Nevertheless, US corporate laws place some limits on the business judgment rule 
to prevent the severest shirking behaviour. Firstly, the rule is not applicable if there is 
no informed business decision. To acquire the rule’s protection, directors must have a 
good knowledge of corporate affairs, pursue the information that raises a cause for 
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concern, and follow due procedures to make decisions.149 In effect, a duty of “process 
due care” is imposed on directors: the courts will focus on the reasonableness of the 
decision-making process a director follows, as opposed to the reasonableness of the 
decision he ultimately arrives at. 150  Secondly, the minimum quality of a business 
decision is required. Directors who have no conflicted interests and exercise process 
due care will still not be protected by the business judgment rule if they make an 
irrational decision that serves no corporate purpose.151 In Delaware, this principle takes 
the form of a prohibition on wasting corporate assets, and a transaction constitutes a 
waste if it involves “an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so 
disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person 
might be willing to trade”.152 
Although Anglo-HK law does not have the concept of “business judgment rule”, 
the orthodoxy has long been settled that the courts should not substitute their own views 
about corporate affairs for directors’ good-faith judgments. Two centuries ago, Lord 
Eldon LC held that “This Court is to be required on every Occasion to take the 
Management of every Playhouse and Brewhouse in the Kingdom …”153 More recently, 
Lord Greene MR emphasized the principle again: “[Directors] must exercise their 
discretion bona fide in what they consider—not what a court may consider—to be in 
the interests of the company …”154 
Nonetheless, some objective elements of directors’ duties in Anglo-HK law 
seem to pave the way for the courts to vet business decisions. First, directors should act 
bona fide in the interests of the company (the duty of loyalty). The courts will assess 
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the compliance of the duty by checking, besides a director’s subjective state of mind, a 
decision’s reasonableness by reference to what “an intelligent and honest man in the 
position of a director of the company concerned … reasonably [believes]”.155 Second, 
directors must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence.156 The standard refers to a 
reasonably diligent person with both the general knowledge, skill and experience that 
the relevant director has and those that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying 
out the director’s functions.157 Hence, in theory, a director may be punished for making 
a low-quality decision, whether she acts honestly or not. 
However, to avoid interfering in genuine business decisions, Anglo-HK judges 
exercise their discretion very cautiously. With respect to the objective facet of the duty 
of loyalty, the courts will evaluate the quality of a business decision objectively when 
“a director fails to address his mind to the question whether a transaction is in the 
interests of the company.”158 If a director honestly believes that her action / inaction is 
beneficial to her company, a breach of the duty will occur only when “it is established 
that the relevant exercise of the power is one which could not be considered by any 
reasonable director to be in the interests of the company.”159  As we can see, this 
standard is quite similar to the waste standard under Delaware law. 
Regarding the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence, the courts 
mainly attack a director’s non-involvement in the management of the company,160 
failure to supervise corporate operations, 161 and not considering important factors in 
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decision-making. 162  However, if directors do take into consideration the factual 
circumstances surrounding a business decision, the courts will defer to directors’ 
judgments, and directors will not be held liable simply for mistakes in their decisions.163 
Barma J gave a good summary of the general judicial approach in a court decision: 
“While I accept that the court should not set itself up as a tribunal to 
which disgruntled litigants can appeal against the commercial decisions 
of the board of directors, I do not think that this excludes the possibility 
that the court can and should, in an appropriate case, inquire into the 
manner in which the decision was reached. … If it is shown that the 
directors have taken account of the relevant factors, and have not acted 
for improper purposes, the weight that they choose to assign to the 
various factors which they properly take into account is a matter for 
them, and not something with which the court should concern itself.”164 
In effect, Anglo-HK corporate laws also impose a duty of ‘process due care’ on 
directors as their US counterparts do. 
It can be safely concluded that US and Anglo-HK courts will only intervene in 
egregious cases with extreme shirking behaviour. However, most shirking behaviour is 
not severe enough to fall into this category, and most corporate controllers who shirk 
their duties may escape legal liability in practice. Nevertheless, law can still facilitate 
other institutions able to curb shirking effectively. 165  For example, high-quality 
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antitrust law contributes to competitive product markets which can punish inefficient 
management. However, it has to be admitted that law cannot directly control shirking 
behaviour,166 except the severest one. 
VIII. Conclusion: What Should Policy-Makers Consider? 
The governance effects of dual class share structures are three-fold. Compared to NCS 
structures, dual class structures prevent shareholders with inferior information from 
influencing corporate decisions and encourage corporate controllers to make firm-
specific investments; but they insulate corporate controllers from shareholder 
monitoring, proxy contests and hostile takeovers. Compared to concentrated ownership 
structures, dual class structures provide companies with broader access to equity 
financing and reduce corporate controllers’ excessive risk-aversion; but they decouple 
corporate controllers’ power from their personal wealth within the company, and thus 
exacerbate both tunnelling and shirking problems. Compared to other CEMs, dual class 
structures are simple, transparent and stable; but they may separate voting rights from 
cash flow rights infinitely, and certain dual class recapitalization mechanisms can 
deprive existing shareholders of their voting rights. 
By virtue of the great value of entrepreneurship, CS structures are usually the 
first choice for entrepreneurs. Policy-makers in most jurisdictions, including Hong 
Kong, do not necessarily need to deal with the drawbacks of dual class structures in the 
first layer of the Framework. With respect to the other two layers, law should curb 
tunnelling and eliminate corporate controllers’ abilities to achieve an extreme voting-
cash flow rights divergence and to infringe existing shareholders’ voting rights. 
However, law cannot control shirking directly. Therefore, when law provides sufficient 
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shareholder protection, the real trade-off inside a dual class structure is between its 
benefits encapsulated above and the problems of shirking.  
Accordingly, policy-makers should first take every step to ensure that law 
carries out its tasks well. Dual class structures’ disadvantages compared to other CEMs 
can be dealt with by relatively simple rules, whereas the solution to tunnelling problems 
entails complicated corporate controllers’ fiduciary duties and their enforcement. If a 
policy-maker is confident about the law of its jurisdiction, then it may make a choice 
between dual class structures’ benefits and constraints on shirking derived from 
concentrated corporate ownership, taking into account the market conditions in its 
jurisdiction, including the efficacy of institutions that can curb shirking. If the policy 
marker prefers the latter, it needs to further think about the regulation of other CEMs 
since they can separate voting rights from cash flow rights as well.             
 
